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Indian Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Rights:
The Record and the Controversy
Donald L. Burnett, Jr.*
ORIGIN AND DIMENSIONS OF THE ISSUE
The nature of legal problems created by the clash between
Indian and white cultures in the United States is clearly illustrated
by the litigation concerning Indian hunting, fishing and trapping.
These pursuits, which formed the core of Indian economic activity
for millenia, still underpin the economies of many tribes or bands
today; and their central role in the life of the Indian has given
them great cultural significance.' When the whites came and conquered, expelling the Indian to the distant and often barren reaches
of the American earth reserved for him, tribal chiefs were generally assured in treaties and formal agreements' that their people
could continue to hunt, fish and trap as they had since time immemorial. In this way a central element of Indian life was written
into and guaranteed by white man's law.
These special guarantees were necessary because the Indians
were a subject people. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia' Chief Justice
Marshall refused to bar enforcement of Georgia law in Cherokee
territory on the basis of the Indians' separate nationhood. He
termed the tribe a "domestic dependent nation," and expressed its
legal relation to the federal government as that of "ward to guardian." This view was reiterated in United States v. Kagama," which
extended federal jurisdiction over homocides committed by Indians
upon each other on the Hoopa Valley Reservation in California:
These Indians are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights.'
*A.B. Harvard University, 1968, Magna Gum Laude; University of Chicago

Law School.
'A discussion of the key elements of tribal cultures in the various regions
of the United States appears in P. FARB, MAN'S RISE To CIvILIZATION AS
SHOWN BY THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS FROM PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE
COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE (1968), entire.

'Treaty-making was discontinued by act of Congress, March 3, 1871, 16
Stat. 544. Formal agreements after that date were embodied in later acts
of Congress.

'30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831). Marshall later granted the Cherokees
immunity from Georgia law in his famous decision in Worchester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832) ; but he continued to term the tribe
a dependent people.
'118 U.S. 375, 6 S. Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).
'id. at 383.
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In the same year, a liberal ruling in Choctaw Nation v. United
States,' increasing the amount of a judgment in favor of the Choctaws for lands ceded in 1830, was based on Indian dependencey:
(T)he recognized relation between the parties in this controversy . . . is that between a superior and an inferior,
whereby the latter is placed under the care and control of
the former."
Liberal decisions resulted from liberal construction of Indian
rights. In Worcester (supra, note 3) Justice McLean had declared
that "the language used in treaties with the Indians should never
be construed to their prejudice."' Kagama and Choctaw Nation
adhered to McLean's dictum, the latter supplying the following
emphasis:
The parties are not on an equal footing, and that inequality
is to be made good by the superior justice which looks only
to the substance of the right, without regard to technical
rules....'
This liberal treatment of the Indian in disputes with the federal
government has been reflected by the general reluctance of federal
authorities to attempt to regulate Indian taking of fish and game.
But there has been no such security from attempted regulation
by the states. The principal problem concerning hunting, fishing and
trapping rights centers on the relation between the Indian and the
states. The courts have confronted a conflict between the states'
claims of power to regulate the taking of fish and game within
their boundaries and the Indian's claim to immunity from such
regulation. Both claims have legal foundation.
The Indian's claim to immunity under the provisions of treaties
and formal agreements with Congress after treaties were discontinued rests with Article VI, Cl. 2 of the Constitution, the "supremacy clause:"
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges
of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The states' claims to regulatory power are based on their
°
sovereignty. The leading decision in Geer v. Connecticut"
upheld
°119 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct. 75, 30 L.Ed. 306 (1886).
'Id. at 28.
'31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 581.
'119 U.S. at 28.
1161 U.S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793 (1896).
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the conviction of a party possessing certain woodcock, ruffed
grouse and quail in violation of state game laws. The Supreme
Court argued the states' power to regulate hunting, fishing and
trapping from two standpoints: first, that since wildlife is the
common property of all the citizens of each state, not the subject
of private ownership, the people of each state might act to limit
or to prohibit the taking of it; second, that the power to regulate
the taking of fish and game is to be construed as part of the general
police power, which cannot be denied to any sovereign state.
The scope of powers which the state might employ to regulate
the taking of wildlife was found to be very wide in Patsone v.
Pennsylvania.nAn opinion authored by Justice Holmes affirmed the
conviction of an Italian alien for owning and possessing a shotgun
contrary to state statute. The law had been enacted to prevent
poaching by aliens. According to Holmes:
(I)t can hardly be disputed that if the lawful object, the
protection of wildlife (Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519),
warrants the discrimination, the means adopted for making
it effective might also be adopted.'
The wide latitude accorded the states in achieving the end of
wildlife conservation established a rationale for attempted state
regulation of Indian hunting, fishing and trapping. An additional
incentive was provided by the slowly expanding scope of state
jurisdiction over other Indian crimes. A first step was taken in
United States v. McBratney," upholding the conviction of a white
man for murder committed on the Ute reservation in Colorado. The
Supreme Court declared that whenever, upon admission of a state
into the Union, Congress had intended to except out of it an Indian
reservation or exclusive jurisdiction over a reservation, it had
done so expressly."' Relying heavily on McBratney in United States
v. Draper,' the Supreme Court ruled that Montana courts had
jurisdiction over crime committed by non-Indians against nonIndians on the reservation. In the same year the Colorado court
8
upholding the conviction
broadened McBratney in People v. Pablo,"
of an Indian who murdered another Indian while off the reservation.
"232 U.S. 138, 34 S. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (1914).
'Id. at 143.
18104 U.S. 621, 26 L. Ed. 869 (1881).
"As authorities for this proposition the Court cited United States v. Ward,
1 Woolw. 17 (8th Circ. 1863) and The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
737, 18 L. Ed. 667 (1866). But these were merely cases in which it was held
that where express provision did exist, Indian lands were exempt. They did not
hold that express provision was an absolute prerequisite to exemption. Nevertheless, the trend toward growing state jurisdiction over Indian affairs was
so strong that McBratney became a landmark case.
"164 U.S. 240,17 S. Ct. 107, 41 L. Ed. 419 (1896).
"23 Colo. 134, 46 P. 636 (1896).
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Establishment of state jurisdiction over one form of Indian
crime made plausible attempts to broaden the range of crimes
covered to include violation of fish and game statutes, especially
in view of the wide latitude accorded the states in selecting the
means by which to regulate the taking of wildlife. The ensuing
attempts by state regulation created a tension between state regulatory power and Indian immunity from state regulation under the
"supremacy clause."
The main part of this essay analyzes the ways in which the
courts have attempted to resolve this tension. But to portray a
complete picture of Indian hunting, fishing and trapping law it
is necessary to review the more settled areas where the tension
does not exist (federal regulation) or where it is not severe (state
regulation on reservation or allotted lands). These latter areas
pose fewer analytical problems; it is convenient to begin by discussing them summarily.
HUNTING, FISHING AND TRAPPING ON RESERVATION
OR ALLOTTED LANDS

17

FederalRegulation
Federal authorities have restrained, for the most part, from
attempting to regulate Indian taking of fish and game on their
own lands. This responsibility generally has been left to the tribal
councils.' In the rare instances of attempted federal regulation,
the courts have adhered to the dictum in Choctaw Nation (supra,
note 6), advocating liberal construction of treaty rights in suits
against the federal government. They have disallowed federal
regulation.
In Mason v. Sams " it was held that neither the Secretary of
the Interior nor the Commissioner of Indian Affairs could propound
regulations specifying where on the reservation each member of
the Quinaielt tribe of Washington could fish; nor could they impose royalties on the fish caught. United States v. Cutler' sustained
the demurrer of a Shoshone-Bannock Indian to the charge of shoot"Allotted lands are those held in trust for Indian owners by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Allotment of lands under this arrangement was initiated by
the General Allotment Act of 1887, 26 Stat. 388, amended (1891) 26 Stat.
794 and (1910) 36 Stat. 859; but was discontinued by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984.
'Opinion of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior. Regulation of hunting
and fishing on Wind River Reservation, Wyoming. M. 31480 (filed with 6556640 Wind River 931).
15 F.2d 255 (E.D. Wash. 1925).
137 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Idaho 1941).
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ing a wild duck on the Idaho reservation after hunting hours for
migratory water fowl, established by federal agencies to give effect
to federal statute.' The court insisted on strict construction of
what the Indians granted under the treaty, and liberal construction
of the rights they retained:
(W) hen considering treaties with Indians and Acts of Congress relating to their rights, we should not forget the wellknown liberal application of the principle, that grants by
them should be regarded "strictissimi juris"; and all uncertainties resolved in their favor.Only where the treaty or agreement is invalid by reason of
direct contradiction with an overriding act of Congress may the
Indian lose his immunity to federal regulation. In Hynes v. Grimes
Packing Co.' the Supreme Court refused to recognize any immunity
of the Karluk Reservation Indians in Alaska from federal regulation
of fishing on the reservation, because the Department of the Interior
edict establishing exclusive fishing rights on the reservation discriminated against white interests, in violation of another act of
Congress.' The broader implication of Hynes is that the Indian can
be subjected to federal regulation on the reservation despite the
provisions of treaties or agreements, whenever Congress expressly
so provides.'
State Regulation
Case Law. As noted earlier (note 17, supra), reservation and
allotted lands are held in trust by the federal government (Bureau
of Indian Affairs) ; they are usually under federal or tribal jurisdiction. Consequently, the states have not made vigorous claims
to regulatory power in these areas. The tension between Indian
rights under the "supremacy clause" and state regulatory power
is not severe. The few attempts at regulation have generally been
unsuccessful.
In Selkirk v. Stevens' the Supreme Court of Minnesota first
distinguished a hypothetical case of game taken and consumed on
the reservation from that of game taken outside the reservation.
2Migratory Bird Treaty, August 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
237 F. Supp. at 725.
t337 U.S. 86, 69 S. Ct. 968, 93 L. Ed. 1231 (1948).
'The White Act of 1924,48 U.S.C. 221, 222-224 (elim.).
'*Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. at
522 (1964). See also the discussion of Congress' power to modify or abrogate
treaties and agreements with subsequent acts, infra. (Note that the overriding act of Congres may precede an executive order, as in Hynes, but
must follow a treaty or formal agreement.)
272 Minn. 335, 75 N.W. 386, 40 L.R.A. 759 (1898).
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The Court acknowledged that the state of Minnesota might have;
no power to regulate reservation hunting. Three years later, in
State v. Cooney', the Minnesota court expressly exempted hunting
for consumption on the reservation from state regulation. In United
States ex. rel. Lynn v. Hamiltone a federal district court in New
York removed the consumption restriction. It dismissed an action
against two Seneca Indians for fishing with a net on the reservation, holding that they were not subject to the conservation laws of
the state. Washington similarly exempted Indians on the reservation
when, in Pioneer Packing Co. v. Winslow", the supreme court of
that state affirmed a decision in favor of a purchaser of steelhead
from Quinault Indians, who caught the fish in a river running
through the reservation.
That this exemption applied to allotted lands as well as the
reservation was indicated in State v. Cloud', holding that the state
of Minnesota had no jurisdiction over a member of the Chippewa
tribe who trapped a muskrat on his land, held in trust. The Minnesota court broadened this immunity in State v. Jackson to cover
an Indian hunting on lands not allotted to him, but to a deceased
member of the same tribe.
State regulation has been extended to reservation or allotted
lands if the treaty or formal agreement under which immunity is
claimed is not authorized by Congress. Thus, in Organized Village
of Kake, etc. v. Egan, etc.," the Tlingit Indians of Alaska were
denied immunity claimed under agreements with the Army Corps
of Engineers and the Forest Service, since these agreements were
not Congressionally authorized.'
Legislative Attempt to Broaden State Regulatory Powers. In
keeping with its policy in the early 1950's, to bring the Indian
more completely under the white man's law3 ', Congress attempted
to broaden the scope of state regulation on reservation of allotted
lands, as well as ceded lands. To effect this policy, Congress passed'
277 Minn. 518, 80 N.W. 696 (1899).

'233 F. 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1915).
'1159 Wash. 655,294 P. 557 (1930).
1179 Minn. 180, 228 N.W. 611 (1930).
1218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W. 2d 752 (1944).
'369 U.S. 60, 82 S. Ct. 562, 7 L. Ed. 2d 573 (1962).
'A companion decision, Metlakatla Indian Community, etc. v. Egan, etc.,
369 U.S. 45, 82 S. Ct. 552, 7 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1962), allowed immunity from
Alaskan regulation, because the rights claimed were granted by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to an act of Congress.
""(I)t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make Indians
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws
and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the United States ....
." H. R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., 99 CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD 9968, 10815 (1953).
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Public Law 280 (1953)', extending state jurisdiction over Indian
affairs in a number of specified states, but exempting hunting,
fishing and trapping protected by treaty or formal agreement."
'In the following year Congress passed the Termination Act of
1954,' providing for termination of federal authority and exclusive
jurisdiction, on a tribe-by-tribe basis, with the Indians' consent.'
Whether the Termination Act, like Public Law 280, exempted
Indian hunting, fishing and trapping appeared to be settled in State
v. Sanapaw, et. al.'. The Wisconsin court, basing its decision on
the apparent intent on Congress, as expressed in House Concurrent
Resolution 108 (supra, note 34), held that there was no such exemption. But in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States"
(1968), the Supreme Court refused to construe the Termination
Act "as a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing
rights of Indians.""' Public Law 280 had to be considered in pari
materia with the Termination Act, argued the Court, and the two
acts taken together were read to mean that
although federal supervision of the tribe was to cease and
all tribal property was to be transferred to new hands, the
hunting and fishing rights granted or preserved by the
Wolf River Treaty of 1854 survived the Termination Act
of 1954.'
The legislative attempt to extend state regulation over hunting
fishing and trapping protected by treaty has been blocked by the
Supreme Court. The immunity of rights not guaranteed by treaty,
but by formal, statute-embodied agreement, remains questionable,
"Act of August 15, 1953, 18 U.S.C., Sec. 1162. (This act was given no
title; it is commonly known as "P. L. 280.")
'This exemption was tested and upheld in Klamath and Madoc Tribes,
etc. v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ore. 1956). Moreover, the impact of
P.L. 280 has been diminished by the "Civil Rights Act" of 1968, 25 U.S.C.
Sec. 1301-1341. Sec. 1321 repealed Sec. 7 of P.L. 280 which had authorized
state to extend criminal jurisdiction over reservations without tribal consent.
'25 U.S.C., Sec. 899.
'Wary of domination by the states, few tribes have consented. Those that
have done so have been moved by frustration with paternalism in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (hereinafter
INDIAN, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS

referred to as
(1966), 191.

COMMISSION),

THE

21 Wis. 2d 377, 124 N.W. 2d 41 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 991, 84 S.
Ct. 1911, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1963).
391 U.S. 404, 88 S. Ct. 1705, 20 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1968).
"Id. at 410. The court undoubtedly knew of the hunger among the Menominees which had resulted from the Sanapaw decision, permitting regulation of
Indian hunting, fishing and trapping to ensure good harvests for white
sportsmen.
COMMISSION, 204.
."Id. at 409.
Justices Black and Stewart dissented, stating that while
Public
Law 280 exempted hunting, fishing and trapping, it did so only where a reservation existed; that with termination, the reservation disappeared, and all
state fish and game laws became applicable.
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since Menominee relied in part on the Termination Act's mention
only of statutes, not treaties, being superseded. Rights not guaranteed either by treaty or statute are almost certainly vulnerable
to state regulation if the tribe has accepted termination; and may
be vulnerable if the state has extended criminal jurisdiction over
the reservation under Public Law 280 with tribal consent.HUNTING, FISHING AND TRAPPING ON CEDED LANDS"
Federal Regulation
The federal government has refrained from attempting to
regulate Indian hunting, fishing and trapping on ceded lands, where
it does not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction.", However, a caveat expressed with regard to reservation or allotted lands applies to
ceded lands as well: the federal government has a potential power
of regulation if the provision of the treaty or formal agreement
under which immunity is claimed is invalid because it contradicts
an overriding act of Congress." Nevertheless, with the exception
of certain statutory prohibitions concerning national military parks
and wildlife preserves", the incidence of federal regulation on
ceded lands is insignificant.
State Regulation
The extent of Indian immunity from state regulation on ceded
lands has been a question for the courts; Congress' apparent attempt in the Termination Act to broaden the scope of state jurisdiction over Indian hunting, fishing and trapping-both on reservation or allotted lands and on ceded lands-was blocked by the
Menominee decision (supra, note 40). Attempting to resolve the
question, the courts have confronted directly the tension between
"However, the Metlakatlt Indian Community decision (supra, note 33)
made it clear that rights acquired by executive order authorized by Congress
remain immune, even in a Public Law 280 state such as Alaska.
"Ceded lands are those relinquished by the Indian to the white man by treaty
or formal agreement, usually with hunting, fishing and trapping rights on
those lands reserved.
'"In 1965 the Secretary of the Interior announced his intention to amend
Title 25 of the United States Code to include a section containing regulations
of off-reservation treaty fishing. Execution and prosecution were to be left
to the states. See 30 Fed. Reg. 8969 (1965). But to this writer's knowledge,
no official action has been taken.
"This caveat is not restricted to land. In the James G. Swan, 40 F. 108
(D.Wash. 1892), Makah Indians, hunting seal from a boat in the Bering Sea
were adjudged to have no immunity under a treaty provision protecting
hunting rights, because that provision contradicted an act of Congress protecting the seal and giving effect to a conservation treaty with Russia. Recall,
however, that Cutler (supra, note 20) held one who hunted on the reservation
immune to regulations issued pursuant to another treaty and statute.
' 7 See 16 U.S.C., Sec. 414, 415, and 18 U.S.C., Sec. 41, respectively.

1970]"

INDIAN HUNTING, FISHING, TRAPPING

the soverign power of the states to regulate the taking of fish and
game within their borders and the "supremacy clause," underpinning Indian claims to immunity from state regulation.
Early Decisions: No Immunity. The Removal Act of 1830
caused most Indian tribes to be relocated in the West, where states
had not yet been formed. Treaties and formal agreements with
these tribes generally preceded acts of statehood. The early decisions adopted the view, based in part on McBratney (supra, note
13), that the acts of admission were acts of Congress which superseded the treaties or formal agreements; that these acts, unless
they expressly reserved to the Indian his full hunting, fishing and
trapping rights on ceded lands, should be read to invest in the states
a sovereign regulatory power. The Indian's rights were, as a result,
severely restricted.
This line of argument avoided direct conflict of the states'
regulatory power with the "supremacy clause"; it had been well
settled that Congress could supersede solemn treaties or formal
agreements with subsequent acts." The leading early case applying
that principle to Indian treaties was The Cherokee Tobacco.' The
Supreme Court, in a majority decision, ruled that federal revenue
laws could be extended to cover tobacco and liquor in Indian country
despite a treaty protecting the Indians from such taxation. The
majority held that
a treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress . . . and
an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty. . . . In
the cases referred to those principles were applied to treaties with foreign nations. Treaties with Indian nations . ..
have no higher sanctity; and no greater inviolability or
immunity from legislative invasion can be claimed for them.'
Ward v. Race Horse" applied this argument to admission acts
in a leading hunting case. A member of the Bannock Tribe on the
Fort Hall reservation in Idaho was convicted of shooting illegally
seven elk in Wyoming, on land ceded by the Indians in 1863. The
treaty of that year assured the Bannocks of "the right to hunt
upon the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game
may be found thereon."' The Supreme Court upheld the.conviction:
"84 Stat. 411.

"There was a hint at this power in the previous discussion of potential
federal regulatory power where the immunity claimed conflicts with an overriding act of Congress.
178 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616,20 L. Ed. 227 (1870).
"Ild.
at 621.
'163 U.S. 504,16 S. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244 (1896).
13KAPPLER, LAWS AND TREATIES II (1904), 1021.
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The power of all the states to regulate the killing of game
within their borders will not be gainsaid, yet, if the treaty
applies to the unoccupied land of the United States in the
State of Wyoming, that State would be bereft of power....
The enabling act declares that the State of Wyoming is
admitted on equal terms with the other states."
The admission act, granting Wyoming the full sovereign power
enjoyed by other states, superseded the earlier treaty, and freed
the state to regulate Indian hunting on ceded lands. Treaty rights
afforded the Indian no immunity.
The Supreme Court of Washington soon adopted the Race
Horse view. State v. Towessnute' involved a Yakima Indian arrested and convicted of having fished illegally for salmon off the
reservation. Upholding the conviction, the court stated that the
Yakima treaty could not limit the regulatory power the state
acquired upon its admission. In a similar case, State v. Alexis," the
Washington court affirmed the conviction of a Lummi Indian who
claimed immunity under a treaty essentially the same as that
involved in Towessnute. Declared the court: "Congress, in making
provision for the Indians, could not do it at the expense of the
police power of a future state."' 7
New York, in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, also
took up the state sovereignty argument, modifying slightly that
part of it relating to acts of admission. In New York ex. rel. Kennedy v. Becker ' three Senecas were convicted of spear fishing in
a stream outside the reservation, but within the bounds of property granted by the Seneca tribe to Robert Morris in a 1797 treaty
ratified by the United States Senate. The grant contained a reservation of rights to fish and hunt on the ceded land. The Supreme
Court held that when the land passed into private hands, it came
under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the state of New York.
Were the state's regulatory powers over this new land area within
its borders to be limited by the treaty, New York's sovereignty
would not be equal that of other states admitted to the Union.
Accordingly, the Court ruled the Senecas subject to "that necessary power of appropriate regulation . . . which inhered in the
sovereignty of the state.""
5'163 U.S. at 514.

'89 Wash. 478, 154 P. 805 (1916).

'89 Wash. 492, 154 P. 810,155 P. 1041 (1916).
154 P. at 493.
58241 U.S. 556, 36 S. Ct. 705, 60 L. Ed. 1166 (1916).
9
'I1d. at 563-564.
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In 1921 the Washington court expressed some inclination to
recognize a degree of Indian immunity from state regulation; but,
encouraged by the Kennedy decision, it voted four-to-three in State
v. Meninock' to affirm the conviction and fining of several Yakimas
for fishing a stream admittedly covered by treaty. In People v.
Chosa,'a the Michigan court also relied heavily on Kennedy as it
upheld conviction of a Chippewa for illegal trout fishing in a lake
within ceded territory. Finally, in State v. Wallahee," the court
affirmed by a four-to-one vote the conviction of another Yakima
for killing a deer in the Cascade Mountain area off the reservation
but within the land ceded. There was no doubt of the applicability
of the treaty, which also protected hunting. The reasoning of the
court represented the final evolution of state sovereignity doctrine:
(T)he United States government was the sovereign and
did not undertake to part with its sovereign rights by the
treaty. .

.

. (T)he Yakima tribe was not an independent

nation nor a sovereign entity of any kind, the Indians being
mere occupants of the land, and at that time, and ever since
were subject to the sovereignty of the United States ...
(T)hen, and at all times up to statehood, the federal government had the sovereign power to regulate or forbid
the taking of game; and within our territorial jurisdiction,
that sovereign power passed to the state of Washington when
admitted to statehood."
Each of these early decisions disallowing immunity from state
regulation pointed up a paradox relating to Congress' ultimate
sovereignty. That sovereignty had appeared to afford the Indian
protection under the "supremacy clause." But since it also allowed
Congress to abrogate treaties and formal agreements, it was susceptible to use against the Indian. It was so used by Race Horse,
Kennedy, and their progeny. The tension in these cases between
the "supremacy clause" and state regulatory power was resolved
in favor of the latter.
Countercurrent:Developments in Constitutionaland Property
Law. While early decisions were being handed down, another set
of opinions challenged the superseding act argument of Race Horse.
In United States v. Winans' suit was brought in behalf of the
Yakimas to enjoin respondents, fishwheel operators holding a state
patent, from depriving the Indians of their fishing rights through
®115 Wash. 528, 197 P. 641 (1921).
®a252 Mich. 154, 233 N.W. 205 (1930).
"143 Wash. 117, 255 P. 94 (1927).
1255 P. at 95.
-198 U.S. 371, 26 S. Ct. 662, 49 L. Ed. 1089 (1905).
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the operation of the fish wheel. The Yakimas pointed to their 1855
treaty, which ensured them the exclusive right of taking fish on the
reservation, and the right of taking fish at all "usual and accustomed" places "in common" with the citizens of the territory." The
Court found that the phrase "in common" did not mean the Indians
could be excluded from their "usual and accustomed" places by
whites; nor did the state patent permit exclusion. The Court ruled
that Congress created rights, including Indian hunting, fishing
and trapping rights, while Washington was still a territory, which
remained enforceable after statehood. In United States v. Brookfield Fisheries,' the Winans lead was followed, as the United States,
again suing on behalf of the Yakimas, obtained an order prohibiting another holder of a state patent from blocking the Indians'
access to a small strip of ground along the Columbia River from
which the Indians had been accustomed to fishing.
These opinions held that statehood did not terminate federally
granted Indian rights in conflict with state powers." The holdings
applied to hunting, fishing and trapping disputes a familiar constitutional principle modifying that on which Race Horse was
based: while Congress can supersede treaties (Indian or nonIndian) with subsequent acts, the rights established under those
treaties and agreements can not be extinguished by implication.
Rights remain enforceable until expressly rescinded by Congress.'
Admission acts in the early cases contained no specific provisions regarding Indian treaty rights. The court argued that had
Congress intended to preserve these rights, it would have done so
expressly. The language in Race Horse was typical:
(T)he enabling act not only contains no expression of the
intention of Congress to continue the burdens in question
in the state (jurisdiction over Indian hunting, fishing and
trapping), but, on the contrary, its intention not to do so is
conveyed by the express terms of the act of admission.'
supra, note 53, at 699.
124 F. Supp. 712 (D.Ore. 1938).
"However, the holdings did not quarrel directly with the states' power to
regulate the exercise of those rights. The Winans court made clear its unwillingness to judge the extent of regulatory power: "Nor does (the right to take
fish at all usual and accustomed places) restrain the State unreasonably, if
at all, in the regulation of the right. It only fixes in the land such easements
as enable the right to be exercised." 198 U.S. at 384.
'See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 46 S. Ct. 352, 68 L. Ed.
782 (1924) and Pigeon River Improv. S. and Boom Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138,
54 S. Ct. 361, 78 L. Ed. 695 (1933), holding that intent to abrogate a treaty
by statute will not be lightly attributed to Congress. See also United States
v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 22 S. Ct. 629, 46 L. Ed. 878 (1902) and Cook
v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 53 S. Ct. 305, 77 L. Ed. 641 (1933), holding
that the purpose of Congress to abrogate a treaty must be clearly expressed
in "163
the statute.
U.S. at 515.
"KAPPLER,
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The simple fact of admission was taken to mean that: Congress was
relinquishing all authority to the state. Clearly, the Indian hunting, fishing and trapping rights under treaty had been extinguished by implication. Breaking from the Race Horse pattern,
and applying the counterprinciple of express rescission of treaty
rights, Winans and Brookfield re-established the tension between
treaty rights under the "supremacy clause" and state regulatory
power. No longer were acts of admission, silent on treaty rights,
necessarily to be interpreted as extinguishing those rights which
conflicted with the sovereign powers of the new states.
Complementing this pressure to give fuller effect to treaty
rights was the growing conviction, expressed in liberal decisions
concerning Indian property', that original occupancy of the land
conferred property rights secure from invasion by the states."
A first step away from state invasion was taken in. Jones v.
Meehan'. The Supreme Court held that the descendants of an
Indian signatory of a treaty were entitled to the land reserved in
that treaty. Indian property rights were transferable between
generations without governmental interference.
In Winans the Supreme Court stated that the treaty was not
a grant of rights to the Indian, but a reservation of those not
granted from them." This indicated that the Indian's rights included anything not expressly bargained away in the treaty. Pioneer Packing v. Winslow" was decided in the same spirit. The
Washington court held that the Quinault Indians owned the fish in
the Quinault River by the same title and in the same right as they
had owned them prior to the treaty, even though the treaty did not
certify their ownership. Similarly for formal agreements: it was
decided in State v. Cloud' that the Chippewa Indian had a property
'Liberal interpretation of property rights probably was, in part,. a recation
against the rapacious exploitation by whites, while the General Allotment Act
(supra, note 17) was in effect, of Indian landholders who did not understand
finance and often had no appreciation of the concept of property. COMMISSION, 20.

"'This conviction may be viewed as a return to the spirit of Marshall's
dictum in Cherokee Nation (supra, note 3): "They are acknowledged to have
an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned, right to the lands they occupy,
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
v175 U.S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 1, 44 L. Ed 49 (1899).
"This position is somewhat inconsistent with the holding that Congress
could create rights binding after statehood. The Court apparently took both
views on treaty rights--"granted" and "reserved"-because it had two objectives: to reject the admission-act-as-superseding-act argument, and to establish
that the Indian enjoyed unextineuished property rights based on occupancy.
"159 Wash. 655, 294 P. 557 (1930).
"'Note 30, supra.
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right in the muskrats he trapped on his allotted land, even though
the allotment agreement was not explicit on the point.
Finally, United States, etc. v. Santa Fe and Pacific R.R." held
that occupancy alone established a property right; further, that
if Congress were to extinguish that right, it was required to do
so expressly, not by implication, and to compenstate the Indian
for his loss." The language of Santa Fe regarding property rights
paralleled that of the constitutional principles underlying Winans
and Brookfield, Indian rights were not extinguishable by implication. Only Congress, by express decree, could terminate them. From
two separate quarters, then, came pressure to recognize the sanctity of Indian rights from invasion by parties other than Congress.
These new pressures forced reevaluation of the tension between
Indian hunting, fishing and trapping rights under the "supremacy
clause" and the states' regulatory power. Some degree of Indian
immunity from regulation apparently had to be acknowledged.
Later Compromise Decisions: Degrees of Immunity. The
courts' response to these pressures was to seek a compromise: to
reaffirm the states' power to regulate, but to limit the exercise of
that power, allowing the Indian some measure of immunity. The
landmark decision suggesting such a compromise was Tulee v.
Washington". The case involved a Yakima convicted of catching
salmon with a net without having first obtained a fishing license as
required by state law. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed
the conviction, but the United States Supreme Court reversed,
declaring the licensing statute invalid as applied to the Yakimas.
The treaty under which protection was sought contained the standard provision, ensuring the Indians' right to fish in ceded areas
at "usual and accustomed" places. The Supreme Court held that
imposition of the license fee constituted an illegal state tax on the
exercise of a right guaranteed by the federal government. This
holding diverged from the pattern of the early cases; it declared the
Yakimas immune to a regulation which applied to whites. Moreover, the Court added this important dictum:
(T) he treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions of a purely
-314 U.S. 339, 62 S. Ct. 248, 86 L. Ed. 260 (1941).
That these rights were compensable indicated that the law had begun to
turn away from the early notion that the Indian's right was one of mere
occupancy terminable at the whim of Congress. Recall the language of the
Walkahee opinion (supra, note 61). See also Spalding v. Chandler, 160
U.S. 394, 16 S. Ct. 360, 40 L. Ed. 469 (1895) and Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 542, 5 L. Ed. 681 (1823).
7315 U.S. 681, 62 S. Ct. 862, 86 L. Ed. 1115 (1942).
7
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regulatory nature concerning the time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the conservation of fish ....
..(Emphasis supplied.)
Restriction of the state to regulations necessary for the preservation of fish represented a significant departure from the previous
refusal to acknowledge any degree of Indian immunity. Now the
Indian was immune to any fishing regulation which could not be
proved necessary to the preservation of the fishery.
The Tulee dictum was applied in the holding of Makah Indian
Tribe, et al v. Schoettler, etc.," that the state could not prohibit
the Makahs from net fishing the Hoko River, a "usual and accustomed" place, since the prohibition of nets was not "necessary
for the maintenance of the salmon run in the stream."' In setting
this limitation, the federal district court refused to interpret "necessary" simply as "appropriate"; it applied a more rigorous construction in view of the fact that prohibition of net fishing, as
sought by the state, would virtually have eliminated the salmon
harvest of the Makahs, many of whom depended upon it for subsistence.'
In 1953 the Idaho supreme court boldly established complete
Indian immunity to state regulation. State v. Arthur' involved the
shooting of a deer out of season, on land ceded by 1855 treaty,
by a member of the Nez Perce tribe. The treaty reserved to the
tribe the privilege of hunting upon open and unclaimed land. The
Arthur court dismissed the "necessary" dictum of Tulee as unnecessary to the Tulee holding, and ignored its application by the
Washington court in Makah. The court focused on the "supremacy
clause:"
Article 6, C1. 2 of the Federal Constitution expressly declares that the Federal Constitution and the laws of the
United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, shall be the supreme law of
the land. . . . (T) his in effect holds the application of the
(state game) statute in abeyance during the existence of
the treaty.'
The state was barred from regulating treaty Indian hunting, fishing and trapping on ceded lands.
"Id. at 685.
"192 F.2d 224 (9th Circ. 1951).

'192 F.2d at 225.
'The court explained that salmon or steelhead on spawning runs in fresh

water seldom feed, hence cannot be caught with baited hook, the only feasible
alternative to net fishing.
"74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). Cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937, 74 S. Ct.
627, 98 L. Ed. 1087 (1953).
"261 P.2d at 141.
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The impact of Arthur's "supremacy clause" argument was
felt in Washington when the supreme court of that state, which
had usually taken a harder line on Indian rights, came within one
vote of adopting the "no regulation" rule. The case, State v. Satiacum , involved two members of the Puyallup tribe arrested for
possession of two salmon and three steelhead caught illegally with
nets outside the reservaion. The Puyallups claimed immunity under
the tribe's 1855 treaty.One opinion of the court was modeled after
Arthur. It was supported by four judges, but four others dissented.
Their opinion dismissed Arthur as an Idaho decision, unnecessary
as an authority in view of the ample supply of Washington cases.
It then endorsed the Tulee-Makah "necessary" rule. The court's
chief justice refused to break the tie; defendants were exonerated
because the state had not even proven its regulation "necessary."
After Washington had wavered between "necessary regulation and "no regulation," a federal appeals court in Oregon adopted
an intermediate position in Maison v.Confederated Tribes of Umat'illa Indian Reservation.' Taking its cue from another dictum in
Tulee, which had described the licensing statute as not "indispensable" to the conservation program, the court declared that
in both the Tulee and Makah cases it was held that the
Indians' right to fish is qualified by the state's right to
regulate such fishing when necessary for conservation. But
to establish necessity the state must prove two facts: first,
that there is a need to limit the taking of fish, second, that
the particular regulation sought to be imposed "indispensable" to the accomplishment of the needed limitation.'
The court explained that regulation of the Indian was to be a last
resort. All other options, including firmer regulation of white fishing, had to be exhausted first.
However, the Washington court proceeded to establish a new
rule, greatly restricting Indian immunity. The court had been
attacked throughout the state for releasing defendants in Satiacum
in accord with the degree of immunity provided by the "necessary"
rule.' This time, in State v. McCoy', the court affirmed the state's
power to regulate the taking of fish and game subject only to a
"reasonable and necessary" limitation. Applying this new rule, the
court convicted a Swinomish Indian of net fishing off the reservation during a closed period.
"50 Wash 2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957).
85314 F.2d 169 (9th Circ. 1963). Cert. denied, 375 U.S. 829, 84 S. Ct. 73,
11 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1963).
'Id. at 172.
'See Hobbs, supra,note 25, at 526.
"63 Wash. 2d 521,387 P.2d 942 (1963).
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"Reasonable and necessary"appeared to allow a narrower
range of Indian immunity than had the "necessary" guideline. The
additional term chosen to create the new rule, "reasonable," generally had been understood to mean "appropriate" in the Kennedy
sense (supra, note 58). In practice, this usually meant those regulations currently in force.'
This was confirmed when the new rule was restated by the
Washington court" and upheld unanimously in 1968 by the United
States Supreme Court in Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, etc."
The state had been seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
Indian net fishing for salmon and steelhead. Cause was remanded
because the injunction sought was too broad, but the trial court was
instructed that
the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction
of commercial fishing and the like may be regulated by the
State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriatestandards and does not discriminate
The overriding police power of the
against the Indians ....
State . . . is preserved.' (Emphasis supplied.)
To reinforce the impression that the Indian's special rights under
treaty were not recognized, the Court closed with an oblique warning "that any ultimate findings on the conservation issue must also
cover the issue of equal protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with'."
The attorneys general of Washington, Oregon and Idaho, who
had argued the state's case in the Supreme Court, later concluded
that the meaning of Puyallup was that "the states can establish
limits, seasons, manner and method of fishing, gear restrictions,
etc., by proper regulation and in conformity with existing statutes.""
But the probable effect of Puyallup on later litigation was still
unclear. The language chosen augured unfavorably for the Indian,
as it appeared to breathe new life into Kennedy. On the other hand,
'See discussion of the "reasonable" guideline in Note, Regulation of Treaty

Indian'Fishing,43 WASHINGTON L REv. 670 (1968).
°70 Wash. 2d 245, 422 P.2d 754 (1967).

-391 U.S. 392, 88 S. Ct. 1725, 20 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1968).
:
"391 U.S. at 395.
"The phrase "in common with" was apparently included in many Northwest

treaties to ensure that whites could also: fish in ceded territory. The Court

chose not to explain how equal protection might necessarily be implied.
"Memorandum to the governors of Washington, Oregon and Idaho,. Re:
Puyallup (1968) at 2. (Original copy of this memorandum in office of Governor Tom McCall, Salem, Oregon.)
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the Court actually disposed of the case by remanding it with instructions to limit the injunction sought. One could read into
Puyallup what one wanted to find. Comment ranged from approval
of the Court's firm stand against Indian hindrance of conservation endeavors' to a cautious observation that at least the state
had not been given a carte blanche to apply to the Indian all regulations covering whites."
The courts were similarly split. In People v. Jondreau," a
Michigan appeals court relied upon the "reasonable and necessary"
rule to uphold conviction of a Chippewa for illegal trout fishing in
a lake off the reservation. The court explained that, in its view,
Puyallup affirmed the old Chosa" decision, which had applied the
Kennedy rule of "appropriate regulation" to a similar fact situation. The state sovereignty arguments of Kennedy and Chosa were
invoked:
The treaties evidently established a servitude of the right
to hunt and fish on the ceded land in favor of the Indians
and
against the exclusive dominion of private ownership,
but they
provided no immunity from operation of game
laws, as against the State."
But a federal district court in Oregon disagreed. In Sohappy
v. Smith,'" several tribes and bands that fish along the Columbia
River and its tributaries sought a decree defining their rights and
the premissible extent of state regulation. The court carefully
traced the history of the issue, emphasizing the rules of liberal
construction of treaties established in Choctaw Nation"' and the
Indians' great concern during treaty negotiations about their rights
to continue to resort unhindered to their traditional hunting and
fishing grounds. Critical attention was focused on the state's conservation policies:
(Oregon) has divided the regulatory and promotional control between two agencies-one concerned with the protection and promotion of fisheries for sportsmen (ORS 496.160)
and the other concerned with protection and promotion of
commercial fisheries (ORS 506.036). The regulations of
these agencies, as well as their extensive propagation efforts,
are designed not just to preserve the fish but to perpetuate
'Note, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 725, 732 (1968).
"Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights 1I, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. Rzv.
1251, 1258 (1969).
115 Mich. App. 169, 166 N.W.2d 293, (1968).
"People v. Chosa, supra,note 60a.
"252 Mich. at 160, 233 N.W. at 207.
' 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969).
'Choctaw Nation v. United States, supra, note 6.
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and enhance the supply for their respective user interests
... .There is no evidence in this case that the defendants
have given any consideration to the treaty rights of Indians
as an interest to be recognized or a fishery to be promoted in
the state's regulatory and developmental program."
Against this background, the court interpreted Puyallup as
imposing three limitations on state power to regulate Indians:
(1) regulations must be "necessary for the conservation of fish;"
(2) they "must not discriminate against the Indians;" and (3)
they must meet "appropriate standards."'' The latter two were
supported by the Puyallup Court's own words, while the first was
taken from the Tulee dictum which the Court appeared to affirm.
The crucial term "appropriate," around which Puyallup and Kennedy were centered, was defused and place in new context:
In determining what is an "appropriate" regulation one
must consider the interests to be protected or objectives to
be served. In the case of regulations affecting Indian treaty
fishing rights the protection of the treaty right to take fish
at the Indians' usual and accustomed places must be an
objective of the state's regulatory policy co-equal with the
conservation of fish runs for other users."
Having cleared the way, the district court drew from Puyallup
a meaning as favorable to the Indians as could be tenably maintained:
The Supreme Court had said that the right to fish at all
usual and accustomed places may not be qualified by the
state. . . . I interpret this to mean that the state cannot
so manage the fishery that little or no harvestable portion
of the run remains to reach the upper portions of the stream
where the historic Indian places are mostly located ...
In prescribing restrictions upon the exercise of Indian treaty
rights the state may adopt regulations permitting the treaty
Indians to fish at their usual and accustomed places by
means which it prohibits to non-Indians.'"
Moreover, while the court was careful not to express reliance
on the Umatilla "indispensable" rule discredited by Puyallup, it
announced that "some of the fish now taken by the sportsmen and
commercial fishermen must be shared with the treaty Indians,
as our forefathers promised over a hundred years ago."'lStricter
regulation of whites before treaty Indians was implied. The disputing parties were encouraged to negotiate allocation agreements
101302 F. Supp. at 909, 910.
0MId. at 907.

"'Id.
"Id. at
at 911.
911.
"'Id. at 911.
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assuring the Indians a "fair share" of the fish in the Columbia
River system.'
Briefly, the highlights of the later compromise decisions were
these: Tulee and Makah, propounding the "necessary" rule, established a limited measure of Indian immunity from state regulation. The Idaho court in Arthur adopted a "no regulation" rule,
taking this immunity to its logical extreme. Umatilla set forth
the only slightly less liberal "indispensable" doctrine. The Washington court, after flirting with the "no regulation" rule in Satiacum, adopted the "reasonable and necessary" rule in McCoy and
Puyallup. The United States Supreme Court upheld the latter in
a vague decision, its language appearing to indicate that the Indian is subject to "appropriate" state regulation. A Michigan tribunal, upholding convictions in Jondreau,attributed the Kennedy
sense of "appropriateness" to Puyallup; but the Sohappy court redefined "appropriateness" for its own purposes and came very near
to reading the "indispensable" doctrine back into law, as it protected the Indian's right to a "fair share" of fish. The Supreme
Court had spoken ambiguously; and the tension between Indian
immunity under the "supremacy clause" and state regulatory
power remained unresolved.
Perspective on Puyallup: A Taking of Sides. If construction
of Puyallup along the lines of Kennedy and Jondreau, as opposed
to its more liberal treatment in Sohappy, should eventually prove
to be the end product of the later compromise cases, the compromise would be a harsh one for the Indian. A familiar political truth
is involved: state legislatures and agencies are disinclined to
enact restrictive regulations on the exploitation of a natural resource such as wildlife unless future exploitability is threatened.'
Such regulations are unlikely to fail the "reasonable and necessary"
" The court did not elaborate on how such agreements might be enforced.
A hint of the problems which could arise appeared in State v. Gowdy ---Ore.
...... , 462 P.2d 461 (Ct. App. Ore. 1969). That court sustained conviction of
two Yakimas for illegal net fishing, ruling that Indians violating regulations established by their tribes lost their treaty rights and were subject to
the same regulations as whites. Authority was cited as Whitefoot v. United
States, 293 F.2d 658, 155 Ct. Cl. 127 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818, 82
S. Ct. 629, 7 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1962). However, this decision does not appear
to be in point. It merely held that fishing rights were communal property
of the tribe; and that where a federally financed dam destroyed the fishery,
compensation was to be paid to the tribe, not directly to individuals. At most,
this might be extended to mean that tribal agencies can regulate the use of
tribal property such as treaty fishing rights, but not that a state court may
treat Indian defendants as whites, stripped of treaty rights, whenever tribal
regulations have been violated.
'See discussions of the politics of conservation by Patterson and Wildavsky
in DAEDALUS, "America's Changing Environment," Vol. 96, No. 4 (Fall
1967).
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or "appropriate" test. The practical result is that the Indian is
generally subject to those regulations applying to whites.'
The Indian's prior claim to fish and game, based on his treaty
or formal agreement rights and his occupancy rights, would not
be recognized. From the Indian's viewpoint, this would be an outrage. Reservation of rights to hunt, fish and trap on the ceded
lands is an integral part of most treaties. It is usually one of the
first items listed among concessions to the Indian." ° Without it,
dozens of treaties, especially those with Western tribes who hunted,
fished and trapped for subsistence, might never have been concluded.
The Indian was not a skilled jurist. He could not read or
write English; treaties were interpreted to him-often imperfectly, since the native dialects had no words to express concepts
of property. His grasp of treaty provisions was limited. He lacked
the political sophistication to foresee that exercise of his reserved
rights might be regulated later by sovereign entities, states, which
did not exist when the treaties were signed; and that this regulation
could threaten to reduce his rights essentially to those of the white
man.' What the Indian was led to believe was a valuable concession, inducing him to sign treaties ceding millions of acres of land,
might be converted to no concession at all. Such disposition of
treaty rights would hardly reflect the spirit of Justice McLean's
dictum, "the language used in treaties with the Indians should
never be construed to their prejudice.""
The harshness of the compromise is even more apparent when
it is considered that, in addition to purely legal claims to priority,
the Indian has a weighty claim based on economic necessity. Those
tribes which hunt, fish and trap most intensely are most likely to
run afoul of state regulations; yet these are commonly the tribes
most dependent on wildlife for subsistence or economic livelihood.
109Puyllup reaffirmed that Indian hunting, fishing and, trapping rights
could never be destroyed altogether (while, in theory, the states could completely prohibit all white taking of fish and game). In reality, however, this
constitutes no special treatment of the Indian, for the states have not completely prohibited white activities. The states have needed only to regulate
the taking of fish and game, so the Indian is in danger of being subject to
state regulation to the same extent as whites.
"'See KAPPLER, supra, note 53. A quick glance at treaties with hunting and
fishing tribes will reveal that reservation of rights to fish and game on ceded
lands was a key element in most agreements.
".'A sensitive treatment of the Indian's difficulty understanding treaties,
and the problems this creates in the law, may be found in the opinion of
Justices Jackson and Black in Northwestern Band of Shoshone Indians v.
United States, 324 U.S. 335, 6.5 S. Ct. 690, 89 L. Ed. 985 (1944).
:
"'See note 8, supra....
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The availability of fish or game as a food item is often of great
importance to Indian families, estimates of whose current annual
income range from $1500 to $2000."' The significance of salmon
fishing, for example, as an economic enterprise is especially great
in view of the need for viable indigenous industries, serving both
as sources of development capital and as social anchors for the
tribes." ." Such industries are also needed to reduce the extremely
high levels of Indian unemployment. Among employable Yakima
males, for instance, unemployment was last measured at 41%.
In the Lummi tribe the comparable rate was 81%. Both are fishing
tribes in Washington. Unemployment among Indians generally
ranges from 40% to 75%." In light of these conditions, construction of the "reasonable and necessary" rule in favor of the states,
allowing the Indian no substantial rights beyond those of whites,
would be a very stern measure.
Finally, it must be recalled that hunting, fishing and trapping
are of great cultural significance to the Indian. The point is made
by the National Congress of American Indians:
One not familiar with Indians and how they think (at least
the typical reservation Indians) cannot appreciate how important hunting and fishing rights are to them, not only
because of their poverty, but also because of their Indian
traditions. Hunting and fishing (by individuals for subsistence) has a symbolic, perhaps quasi-religious meaning to
many Indians. It is a practicing of their ancient culture,
something many of them cling to fiercely in the face of the
efforts of the state governments, and sometimes even the
federal government, to eliminate Indian rights in the name
of progress and equality. Many non-Indians feel that treaty
promises made 100 years ago have outlived their purpose.
The Indian think not; to him the treaty promises are as
alive as if made yesterday.'
'$1500 has been suggested by P. Collier, "The Red Man's Burden," RAMFeb., 1970, at 30. An equivalent figure is provided by P. Farb, "The
American Indian: A Portrait in Limbo," SATURDAY REVIEw, Oct. 12, 1968,
at 36. The $2000 estimate comes from the Christian Science Monitor, April
16, 1969, at 1, Col. 3.
1'1967 and 1968 "Progress Reports" of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
indicate that fostering such indigenous industry has become an integral
part of federal policy.
"..The Washington court, in McCoy (supra, note 88), recognized the potential
profitability of salmon fishing for the Indian; but regarded it as another
reason for allowing the Indians no substantial immunity from state regulation.
'"House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, MEMORANDUM: INDIAN
UNEMPLOYMENT SURVEY, Committee Print No. 3, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963):
This survey provides careful estimates of unemployment among all major
tribes on reservations. (Puyallup tribe figures were unavailable because that
tribe no longer has a reservation.)
'Brief for Petitioner as Amicus Curiae, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game,
etc., 391 U.S. 392 (1968) at 9.
PARTS,
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To the Indian and his already splintering culture, unfavorable
interpretation of Puyallup would inflict severe damage.
This great danger results from a misdirected attempt at conservation. The "reasonable and necessary" rule makes Indian
hunting, fishing and trapping subject to the adequacy of the resource for all exploiters. That is, when a wildlife resource is in
danger of becoming inadequate to satisfy white sporting and commercial demands, the regulations imposed will usually restrict the
Indian as well as whites, despite the fact that the Indian is generally responsible for a very small share of the harvest of valuable
fish and game. In Puyallup, for example, the trial court found that
only 3% to 5% of the total yearly salmon harvest in Washington
was attributable to the Indians, and that Indian fishing had never
destroyed a salmon run.' The trial court in Umatillafound, similarly, that salmon fishing by Oregon's tribes had never resulted in the
destruction of a run."'
The relatively small Indian harvest constitutes a conservation
problem only because it comes on the heels of the larger exploitation by white commercial and sporting interests. To illustrate,
petitioner in Puyallup showed that over 90 % of the salmon catches
in the Puyallup River are attributable to the activities of white
interests near the mouth of the river. By the time the surviving
fish get upstream to the Indians' "usual and accustomed" fishing
stations, the Indians must assume the burden of restraint in order
to preserve the run.'
To emasculate the Indian's treaty rights is clearly not the
solution to the conservation problem. It is necessary to direct
conservation measures at the greater exploiters-the white commercial and sporting interests. But this is difficult; for the courts
have often openly aligned themselves with these interests.
Exemplary is Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co. (supra, note 23),
in which the Supreme Court ruled that a directive authorizing a
reservation for the Karluk Indians of Alaska, including waters
known for their excellent salmon fishing potential, be judicially
revoked because it discriminated in favor of the Indians and against
the white canneries, in that it gave the former first claim to the
salmon of those waters. This, argued the Court, had not been
authorized by Congress. Moreover, the Court was careful to note
"'422 P.2d at 767.
n9314 F.2d at 173.
l'Brief for Petitioner, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, etc., 391 U.S. 392
(1968) at 8.
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that over one million salmon had been caught at the fishery two
years previous, and that the number had gone as high as four
million. What is more, the Court said, no small amount of white
capital was at stake:
The canners' investment is substantial, running from two
to five hundred thousand dollars, respectively. . . . These
packers employ over four hundred fishermen, chiefly residents of Alaska, and over six hundred cannery employees,
chiefly nonresidents.'
The Court's decision effectively negated the power of the Secretary
of the Interior to establish a reservation for a fishing tribe in a
good fishing location.
The facts in Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United
States' provide further evidence of the strength of white interests.
The Indians sued the United States for refusing to block the intrusion into Indian territory of white-owned canneries employing
Chinese labor, depriving the Indians of many of their land holdings
along the shore, and using Navy gunboats to destroy Indian villages
and put down unrest. The tribes were economically decimated:
The amount of salmon and other fish taken from the streams
by the new white fishing industries and canneries left hardly
enough fish to afford bare subsistence for the Tlingits and
Haidas and nothing for trade or accumulation of wealth.'
The tribes were allowed some compensation for fish in island
streams, but in a second Tlingit and Haida suit in 1968,"' the
Court of Claims refused to compensate the islanders for their loss
of fishing opportunities in the sea around them; fishing rights
lost in navigable waters were not recoverable.
The pressure of white interests has also been visibly at work
in the state of Washington. The second (less liberal) opinion in
Satiacum (supra, note 84) took special care to make clear the
economic importance of salmon to the state and to private white
interests:
The Washington Department of Fisheries, in its 1953 report, placed the capitalized value of fish and shell fish
resources in this state at $679,150,000. To this value must
be added the contribution of salmon as a recreational asset.
In recent years from 150,000 to 200,000 fishermen have
participated in saltwater sport angling ....
They spend
"'337 U.S. at 95-96.
'177 F. Supp. 452 (Ct. Cl. 1959).

'Id.at 467.

"'389 F.2d 778 (1968).
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$8,500,000 annually on fishing trips. There are 160 boathouses and resorts with an investment value of $12,000,000.'
These were the interests that voiced anger when the Indian defendants in Satiacum were released. They organized a campaign,
climaxed by resolutions of the state legislature, for stricter control of Indian fishing. The effect was still being felt when McCoy
came to trial.'
McCoy was complicated further by the fact that the defendant
was a Swinomish, and that tribe had recently dismayed whites
by failing to give swift approval to a plant to convert the entire
Swinomish reservation into a "country club" style residential
development.' Moreover, the defendant had been using a gill net.
Such an apparatus may catch up to 2000 fish in a season; but the
court failed to mention that modern fish traps operated by commercial establishments are capable of harvesting some 600,000
fish per season.' The publicity which surrounded McCoy, and the
celebrated "fish-ins" that followed, served to increase still further
the intensity of white-Indian friction, at a peak when the Puyallup
injunction was sought.
Deep concern for the protection of white interests is not
limited to states which traditionally have taken hard lines on Indian
rights. It was noted earlier that State v. Sanapaw (supra, notes
39 and 41) sanctioned the imposition of Wisconsin regulations on
Indian hunting, fishing and trapping, creating hunger among the
Menominees while the fish and game were saved for white sportsmen. It will be recalled that the Sohappy court revealed the Oregon
Fish and Game Commission's failure to include Indians with whites
as planned beneficiaries of its conservation programs. Testimony
in Umatilla (supra, note 85) had revealed the same problem. The
Chief of the Wildlife Division of the Oregon State Game Commis3ion stated at the trial that his employer, the State Game Commission, used the term "conservation" only to mean protection
:f commercial and sporting hunters and fishermen, with no regard
For the welfare of the Indian.' Apparently the Indian could not
axert the political leverage in the state bureaucracy that whites
-ould. This is not suprising in view of the underdeveloped state
f Indian political organizations.'
L-314 P.2d at 411. The stakes are even greater today.
='Hobbs,
supra, note
25, at
526. in H. Hough,
'"See
discussion
of this
project
DEVELOPMENT

OF INDIAN RE-

3U0RCES (1967), 174-176.

,"See Mrtlakatla Indian Community at the state level. 362 P.2d at 915.

1"314 F.2d at 172-173.

'*'See Comment, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARVARD L. REV.
(1968) 1818, 1830.
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All of these cases, in which the influence of white economic
and sporting interests has been admitted by courts, point up the
fact that disputes over Indian hunting, fishing and trapping rights
are political matters. The politically powerless Indian can only
rely on the courts' sense of fairness and sensitivity to the special
problems of a maltreated people.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Indian hunting, fishing and trapping disputes are of four
types: (1) attempted federal regulation on reservation or alloted
land, and (2) attempted state regulation on these lands; (3) attempted federal regulation on lands ceded by treaty or formal
agreement, and (4) attempted state regulation on these lands. The
law regarding the first three types of disputes is generally well
settled. In the fourth case, the tension between Indian treaty rights
protected by the "supremacy clause" and state regulatory power
has had an unsettling effect. The law in this area historically has
been unfixed; and the Supreme Court's ruling in Puyallup does
not seem to have set the terms for a stable resolution.
(1) The federal government has seldom attempted to regulate Indian hunting, fishing and trapping on reservation or allotted
lands. When such attempts have been made, the courts have disallowed them. Only where the treaty or formal agreement protecting the Indian conflicts with an overriding act of Congress is
federal regulation possible.
(2) The states are also barred from exercising a regulatory
power on reservation or allotted lands, without the tribes' consent,
when the Indian is protected by treaty or formal agreement. However, state regulation is possible if the protection claimed is not
authorized by Congress. Moreover, those tribes which have accepted termination may be vulnerable to state regulation if the
protection claimed is in a form other than treaty. With this exception, the Supreme Court's decision in Menominee has blocked any
broadening of the scope of state regulation through the Termination Act of 1954.
(3) The federal government has made no significant effort
to regulate the taking of fish and game under treaty or formal
agreement on ceded lands. Nevertheless, as noted above, a potential
power to regulate exists if the treaty or formal agreement conflicts
with an overriding act of Congress.
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(4) State regulation on ceded lands has conflicted with
Indian immunity from regulation under the "supremacy clause."
This conflict was resolved in the early cases denying immunity
by the argument that acts of admission to the Union vested in
the states full sovereign power to regulate; and that these acts
of Congress superseded earlier treaties and agreements. However,
a countercurrent in the law produced pressure for change. The
constitutional principle that rights established by treaty can not
be extinguished by implication appeared in fishing rights cases;
and decisions more liberally construing Indian property rights
through occupancy also appeared. Both undercut the admissionact-as-superseding-act argument of Race Horse, although the more
general argument for state sovereignty made in Kennedy survived.
Nevertheless, the countercurrent forced a re-evaluation of the tension between state regulatory power and Indian rights. The result
was a series of compromise decisions, leading to Puyallup, which
established the ambiguous "reasonable and necessary" or "appropriate" guideline for state regulation. Because that guideline can
be construed along the restrictive lines of Kennedy, from which it
was-at least in part-taken, the Indian is threatened by the
possibility that some courts will not recognize his prior legal claim
and his great economic and cultural stake in hunting, fishing and
trapping. This potential harshness may be traced to attempts at
conservation which shy away from attacking the greater exploiters
of wildlife resources: white commercial and sporting interests.
The tension between treaty rights and state power to regulate
has not been resolved in more than one hundred years; it is presumptuous to think it will be soon. Both sides have ample legal
foundation. All the courts really can do is attempt to obtain the
most equitable result on the facts of each case. Such judgments
are singularly political and subject to sway by dominant political
forces. Only in the very long run, when the Indian has developed
more potent political organizations of his own, can he adequately
protect his livelihood and culture. The unsettled history of hunting,
fishing and trapping litigation, and the dangers ahead, demonstrate
that a subject people can not rely merely on liberal canons of construction or even constitutional guarantees to protect their rights.

